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AEW 15

3 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Edward P. Noziglia  
Office of West African Affairs (AFW)  
Department of State  
Room 4242

SUBJECT : Nigeria National Policy Paper

The attached comments are submitted in connection with the 5 November 1963 draft of the Nigeria National Policy Paper. They represent a coordinated view of the covert, DD/S&T, and DD/I components of CIA.

  
Senior Intelligence Support Officer

Copy to: Mr. W. R. Duggan  
Policy Planning Council  
Department of State  
Room 7261

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Comments on the Nigeria National Policy Paper

CIA comments on the 5 November 1963 draft of the Nigeria National Policy Paper are cast both in general and specific terms. General comments have been prepared to take account of some aspects of the overall situation in Nigeria, and on certain aspects of the political situation on which we have important substantive differences, i.e., the amount of support for a government of national union. More specific comments have been prepared on some of the proposed courses of action, and on certain questions where there is a difference of interpretation. Finally, we have noted a number of minor errors of fact, and have commented on the organization of the paper.

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

A. We would agree with the judgment (Page 136) that a crisis in Nigeria's federal system is not imminent, but we seriously question whether there is "widespread support for a government of national union." Although several leading Nigerian politicians have voiced their concern over the need to eliminate party rivalry at the federal level, the amount of support for a

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clearly defined government of national union, which would be acceptable to all the major political parties, is not widespread. Indeed, the events in the Western Region, problems arising from the census, and other events indicate that regional considerations remain extremely powerful. These considerations are also relevant to certain statements made on Pages 66 and 67, and to Policy Recommendation No. 2, Page 73.

In this connection, we are troubled by the sentence (Page 67) beginning, "We must face the fact..." It is difficult to envisage a situation in which the central (federal) government employs increasingly authoritarian measures to carry out its economic policies while, at the same time, it permits the free flow of party rivalry at the regional level. Taken together with the concept of a government of national union, the result would be, in effect, a single party, frequently authoritarian government at the federal level, with the rough and tumble of Nigerian politics prevailing at the regional level. This combination seems unlikely in the African context. For example, we doubt that the present coalition partners would be willing to meet the stiff terms Chief Awolowo would presumably exact for bringing the Western Region into a government of national union.

no - because  
you have in  
each region  
tendency toward  
single party rule.

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Further, Policy Recommendation No. 2 (Page 73) should be clarified. If it is meant that the US believes that it would be helpful if more power were to be placed at the disposal of the Federal Government of Nigeria, then it should be so stated. If something else is intended, the recommendation should so state.

?  
B. In general, the text suggests that authoritarian measures and temporary restrictions of individual freedoms may be pre-requisites to the achievement of the first priority objective of the US in Nigeria, i.e. national unity. Although we recognize that Western concepts of democracy must be adapted to indigenous mores, experience to date in Africa also suggests that the African brand of authoritarianism does not necessarily serve US interests, insure political stability, or prove efficient in paving the way toward economic development. Hence, there may be some merit in seeking to maintain a measure of democracy in one of the few places in Africa where it still has a foothold. Consequently, we wonder whether the paper might be given an added dimension by adding something like the following language to Objective No. 1, Page 13:

*Proposed*  
Such a model would include an appreciable rate of economic and social development in an environment characterized by democratic principles and procedures to the fullest extent consistent with the maintenance of national unity.

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C. We would agree with the judgment (Page 6) that the Six-Year Development Plan has raised unrealistic expectations throughout the country and that the prestige of the Federal Government is committed to its success. However, we believe that Section IX, Economic Conditions and Difficulties (Pages 89-126) portrays an overly optimistic view of Nigeria's economic prospects.

Although Nigeria is endowed with some economic assets, its economy remains fairly basic. In recent years, Nigeria's agricultural exports have generally experienced declining prices, and the trade gap has been bridged largely by drawdowns on foreign exchange reserves. Even more significantly, as the Policy Paper notes (Page 101), the success of the Six-Year Plan depends on Nigeria's willingness to sacrifice present improvements in living standards to investment for the future. Experience elsewhere in Africa, and more generally among underdeveloped states, suggests that leaders are unwilling to make politically unattractive decisions which are required to achieve this goal.

Moreover, even if all the economic development plans were successfully completed, the annual per capita increase in private consumption programmed (one percent) during the Plan period would

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make little impression on the public. Indeed, the slow pace of economic growth postulated is likely to provide new ammunition for those disillusioned with the machinery of government and Nigeria's essentially democratic institutions.

In these circumstances, the Nigerian political system -- already troubled by regional rivalries -- will be subject to disturbing economic pressures as well. There are likely to be continuing popular demands to meet local needs. Under political pressure this may lead the Federal Government to adopt economically unrealistic measures which would further jeopardize economic growth and sharpen internal political differences.

D. We note that there is only a brief reference (Page 28) to the newly-created Mid-West Region. Aside from the politically fluid situation which exists there and probably deserves some comment, this region adds a major, still largely unknown factor to politics at the federal level. Also, the establishment of the Mid-West Region provides an opportunity for the North to enhance its already dominant position by obtaining influence in still another region. Finally, the implications for and reactions to the new region by the Western Region could usefully be assessed.

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E. Some direct reference to the continuing political fluidity in the Western Region should probably be included (Page 21) in the analysis of current political tensions. Intensive, barely below the surface political horse-trading continues in this area. There is at least some chance that a political alliance other than the present NCNC-UPP alliance may emerge.

## II. SOME SPECIFIC COMMENTS

### Page 3, lines 8-11

J We believe that this sentence oversimplifies the present political situation by implying that the line-up is one of a "radical" opposition and a "conservative" government.

### Page 7, last sentence, Page 8, lines 1-5

On Page 8, line 2, it is suggested that the US aid program has gone forward at a fast pace. This is in conflict with Page 10, lines 11-12, which notes that there has been delay and disappointment. We suggest that the word "maintained" be replaced by developed. We should also note that, in Nigerian eyes, the US aid program is regarded as one that is basically inadequate, and one that has come slowly. low?

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Page 10, paragraph 2

We should also note that the Nigerians are well aware of the importance the US has assigned to their country, and recognize that consequently Nigeria's aid expectations are unlikely to rest at current levels.

Page 11, lines 6-10

There are clearly limits to the value the US can extract from its non-colonial position. This is particularly true in connection with the Angola problem -- one which increasingly agitates Nigeria.

Page 12, paragraph 2

Comments on the Nigerian view of the racial situation in the US need revision in light of prevalence in Nigeria of a belief that President Kennedy was assassinated by a racist because of his efforts to end discrimination against Negroes.

Page 18, last paragraph

✓ We are not at all certain that Nigerians see the Federal Government's intervention in the Western Region in the terms set down here. We wonder if the "exercisers" of the supreme national authority were not merely acting as easterners and

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northerners who saw a very good opportunity to belabor the westerners through the instrumentality of the Federal Government. Certainly the westerners saw it in those terms.

Page 20, line 13

The NPC majority, though still slender, is growing.

Page 20, line 17

We suggest adding the underlined words: ....emirs into something more skin to ....

Page 20, line 20

We suggest adding the underlined words: ....own territory and its success in coping with the "southern threat" since independence....

Page 24, lines 12-14

The estimate of the strength of the AG is too weak. We believe that the AG will continue to be a major force in Western politics (although perhaps under some other name).

Page 24, last 2 lines, Page 25, lines 1-14

The radical group of Nigerians who have received aid and guidance for a long time from the Bloc joined under Olantunji

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Otegbeye to form the Socialist Workers and Farmers Party of Nigeria (SWFP) on 17-18 August 1963. The leadership of this party includes leaders of the Nigerian Youth Congress (NYC), and of the pro-Communist Nigerian Trade Union Congress (NTUC). There is reason to believe that the SWFP is intended to be the nexus of an eventual Communist Party with ties to Moscow.

The SWFP is now actively trying to promote a National Democratic United Front (NDUF). The SWFP's objective is to join forces with the United Middle Belt Congress and the Northern Elements Progressive Union in a common front. We believe the NYC will almost certainly remain as one of the basic organizations of the NDUF, if and when the latter is organized (and that the NYC will not merely be succeeded by the SWFP).

In these circumstances, we suggest adding the following words at the beginning of line 6: combining all the various radical elements with such established opposition groups as NEPU and UMBC.

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Pages 31-33

We note that the discussion of the Northern Aristocracy fails to note the identification of the Northern leadership with the Moslem World. This is particularly true of the Sar-dauna who openly demonstrated his affinity during his trip through the Middle East and Pakistan in 1961. He has also identified himself with the Arabs' anti-Israeli campaign. These considerations might also be considered in connection with Nigeria's role in the United Nations (Page 60).

Page 46, lines 10-11

We believe this reference to a "Communist Party" is misleading since this "CP" as well as another proclaimed more recently in Lagos seem to be minute fringe groups having no known relationship to the World Communist movement -- or to any other group.

Page 47. Labor

✓ We believe there should be some discussion of the implications of the formation of the Joint Action Committee. The establishment of the Committee in September 1963 was described, by the US Embassy, as the most significant development in labor in Nigeria since 1945.

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Page 57. Special Problems

We believe it is probably more precise to note that Nigeria's leadership in intra-African affairs has not been commensurate with its size and presumed importance. In part, this has been due to resentment in some quarters over Foreign Minister Wachuku's heavy-handedness. The growth of Nigeria's stature and influence in Africa (Page 58) has been at least retarded by Wachuku's antics.

Page 64, lines 6-7

More recently Nigeria has made overtures to the Common Market by seeking some form of association. Indeed, Nigeria's original rejection of the EEC was considerably less than emphatic.

Page 66, line 6

Strike the words: "the AG"; replace by: any party

Strike the word: "its"; replace by: the AG's

III. COMMENTS ON SPECIFIC SUGGESTED COURSES OF ACTION

A. We believe the discussion of youth and student affairs (Pages 38-42) is adequate, although the limitation

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on the definition of youth as persons between 15 and 25 probably prevented consideration there of a situation which is noted elsewhere in the study, i.e., the widening rift between increasingly disappointed and frustrated youth on the one hand, and the government and its institutions on the other. The study notes a need to keep in touch with developments, but fails to identify the problem as sharply as future events probably warrant.

Nigeria's political and economic prospects suggest that government leaders will find it difficult to channel sufficient resources to satisfy demands which they themselves are stimulating by extensive low-level education of masses of the people who subsequently become uprooted, detribalized, and disruptive urban elements. The inability of the Nigerian Government to meet these new demands lies at the base of the growing estrangement of the youth from present leadership.

Although the paper recommends seven courses of action (Pages 78-79), it seems apparent that they cannot hope to solve the basic problem described above. The proposals are not a priori counter-productive; given unlimited time, funds,

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and personnel they are probably quite valuable. However, if the basic problem of achieving an integration of the educated elite, youth, and students into a constructive process of nation-building is not broached at the same time these recommended programs are going forward the latter may actually become counter-productive. That is, if effective, they will stimulate the educated elite, youth, and students, and enhance their abilities while they remain essentially a disruptive social factor.

B. We note that CIA is specified as an action agency for certain courses of action; on the other hand, CIA is not mentioned in connection with other courses of action although the Agency may be active in the field. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] We strongly urge, therefore, that CIA be omitted from the list of USG agencies responsible for implementation of certain courses of action. [REDACTED]

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#### IV. MINOR FACTUAL ERRORS

##### Page 16, line 13

The major AG push to expand from its regional base came in the December 1959 general election on the eve of independence, not after independence. right

##### Page 17, line 1

More recently, the NPC has become interested in establishing itself outside the North. We suggest adding the words until recently after "interested." OK

##### Page 47, line 5 (Labor Section)

We note that here, as throughout the paper, the Bloc-subsidized labor organization is referred to as the Independent United Labor Congress (IULC). Recently, the IULC changed its name to the Nigerian Trade Union Congress (NTUC), as it was formerly known. OK

#### V. ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER

A. We believe the paper is far too long and would be improved considerably if cut by at least fifty percent.

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B. We assume that a new Part I, embodying the main lines of the study similar to that prepared for the Ethiopia Policy Paper, will be introduced. In that connection, we strongly urge that all courses of action, not only those deemed "major", be included in the Part I.

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~~Mr. Williams~~  
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Mr. Williams  
13 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Edward P. Noziglia  
Office of West African Affairs (AFW)  
Department of State  
Room 4242

SUBJECT : Nigeria National Policy Paper

In the preparation of CIA comments on the  
Nigeria Policy Paper, dated 3 January 1964 one word  
was inadvertently omitted.

Please refer to Page 13, Paragraph B, line 5:  
add the underlined word:

tasks should not be listed as ....

  
Senior Intelligence Support Officer

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